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 Figure 1: Experimental Design  
 
       1st stage 
Randomization 
(N=440) 
       
              
                  
                  
 
Internship Group 
(N=186) 
 
- A future job prospect 
 - A recommendation letter 
    
Wage Group 
(N=176) 
 
- A lump-sum salary 
 -  Performance Pay 
 
      
      
      
      
      
                  
   2nd stage 
Randomization 
(N=63) 
        2nd stage 
Randomization 
(N=74) 
   
              
                  
G1. Career 
incentives only 
N=33 
n=4,448 
    G2. Career  
and wage 
incentives 
N=30 
n=5,298 
  G3. Wage  
and career 
incentives 
N=35 
n=5,836 
    G4. Wage 
incentives only 
N=39 
n=5,939 
          
          
 
 
Notes: Upper case N indicates the number of participants in each stage. Lower case n indicates the number of surveys conducted by census enumerators.
 Figure 2: Training Performance, Selection, Causal, and Combined Effect 
 
Panel A: Training performance (Internship group vs. Wage group) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
      Quiz score         Practice survey error rate 
 
Panel B: Selection Effect (G2 vs. G3) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Survey quality (error rate)           Survey quantity (number of surveys per day) 
 
Panel C: Causal Effect of Career Incentives (G3 vs. G4) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Survey quality (error rate)           Survey quantity (number of surveys per day) 
 
Panel D: Causal Effect of Wage Incentives (G1 vs. G2) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Survey quality (error rate)           Survey quantity (number of surveys per day) 
 
Notes: Panel A presents kernel density estimates of quiz score and practice survey error rate during the training. The Internship group received 
an unpaid job offer with career incentives in the first stage, while the Wage group received a non-renewable paid job offer in the first stage. 
Panels B, C, and D present kernel density estimates of survey quality and survey quantity. Groups 1 and 2 received career incentives in the 
first stage, but only Group 2 received additional wage incentives in the second stage. Groups 3 and 4 received wage incentives in the first 
stage, but only Group 3 received additional career incentives in the second stage.
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 Figure 3: Impact of Supervisor Visits on Job Performance  
 Panel A: Impacts of the first supervisor visit  
          Survey quality (error rate)                 Survey quantity (Number of surveys per day)                   SPE by respondents 
 
 
Panel B: Impacts of the second supervisor visit  
          Survey quality (error rate)                Survey quantity (Number of surveys per day)                   SPE by respondents 
 
 
Notes: The blue horizontal lines in each panel indicate the survey date-specific average of job performances before and after the supervisor visit at day 0. The red 
vertical lines with caps indicate 95% confidence intervals. 
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 Table 1 Experiment Stages 
 
Stage of experiment 
Number of individuals  
G1 G2 G3 G4 
p-value Total (career 
incentives 
only) 
(career 
incentives   
and  
additional wage 
incentives) 
(wage incentives 
and 
additional career 
incentives) 
(wage 
incentives 
only) 
A Target study subjects 
2011 
Dec 
220 220 - 440 
B  
 Study participants 
(baseline survey participants) 
2014 
Dec 
186 (84.1%) 176 (80.0%) .265 362 
C  Trainees 2015 
Jan 
74 (39.8%) 74 (42.0%) .663 148 
D Trainees who failed training 11 0 - 11 
E  Enumerators 2015 
Jan-Feb 
63 (33.9%) 74 (42.0%) 
- 137 
33 30 35 39 
F Number of surveys 4,448 5,298 5,836 5,939 - 21,521 
 
Note: The proportions of individuals remaining over experiment stages are in parentheses. The number of participants in the stage B is divided by the number of 
participants in the stage A, and the number of participants in the stages C and E are divided by the number of participants in the stage B. 
 
 
 
 Table 2 Randomization Balance Check 
 
Variable 
Number of 
observations 
Internship  
group 
Wage 
group 
Mean 
difference  
(p-value) 
Mean 
difference 
(p-value) 
Mean 
difference 
(p-value) 
Internship vs 
Wage 
G2 vs G1 G3 vs G4 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Panel A: 2014 baseline survey     
Age 
362 20.5 20.4 .065 -.200 -.207 
 (.120) (.126) (.707) (.629) (.520) 
Number of 
siblings 
362 4.60 4.17 .432** 5.00 -.158 
 (.132) (.134) (.022) (.315) (.650) 
Asset score 
362 1.09 1.19 -.102 .133 .048 
 (.066) (.067) (.282) (.489) (.799) 
Currently 
working 
362 .097 .074 .023 .036 -.006 
 (.022) (.020) (.455) (.514) (.913) 
Self-esteem 
362 19.4 19.3 -.158 .441 -.768 
 (3.86) (3.51) (.684) (.662) (.341) 
Intrinsic 
motivation 
362 3.10 3.09 .010 .033 -.075 
 (.330) (.351) (.644) (.642) (.372) 
Extrinsic 
motivation 
361 2.84 2.84 .000 .031 .004 
 (.281) (.285) (.896) (.646) (.956) 
Extroversion 
358 3.61 3.47 .140 .055 -.246 
 (1.12) (1.20) (.237) (.851) (.393) 
Agreeableness 
362 5.10 5.10 .008 .035 -.268 
 (.106) (.103) (.955) (.927) (.408) 
Conscientiousness 
361 5.69 5.68 .010 .094 -.054 
 (1.34) (1.36) (.908) (.778) (.850) 
Emotional 
stability 
360 5.08 5.06 .020 .064 -.190 
 (1.49) (1.42) (.905) (.866) (.591) 
Openness to 
experiences 
362 5.14 5.10 .043 -.094 -.268 
 (.114) (.103) (.778) (.779) (.408) 
Time preference 
334 .394 .398 -.004 .072* .013 
 (.011) (.011) (.783) (.050) (.697) 
Risk preference 
335 .629 .642 -.012 .008 -.033* 
 (.007) (.006) (.181) (.714) (.077) 
Rational decision-
making ability 
334 .817 .836 -.019 .037 -.007 
 (.012) (.011) (.234) (.353) (.820) 
Cognitive ability 
index 
362 -.019 .049 -.068 .092 .001 
  (.047) (.049) (.314) (.556) (.995) 
 
 
  
 Table 2 Randomization Balance Check (continued) 
 
Variable 
Number of 
observation 
Internship  
group 
Wage 
group 
Mean difference  
(p-value) 
Mean difference 
(p-value) 
Mean difference 
(p-value) 
Internship vs 
Wage 
G2 vs G1 G3 vs G4 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Male circumcision 
treatment 
362 .425 .460 -.035 -.006 -.226* 
 (.036) (.038) (.498) (.962) (.042) 
HIV/AIDS education 
treatment 
362 .511 .443 .068 -.009 .030 
 (.037) (.038) (.199) (.943) (.800) 
Scholarship treatment 
362 .414 .500 -.086 .021 -.024 
 (.036) (.038) (.101) (.868) (.838) 
Transportation 
reimburse 
362 1525 1547.7 -22.7 -103.9 -57.2 
 (43.8) (41.8) (.708) (.516) (.707) 
Panel B: Characteristics of dispatched catchment areas    
Number of households 
per enumerator  
137 155.3 159.1 -3.79 40.6*** 14.5  
(5.09) (7.48) (.676) (.000) (.335) 
Family size  
137 3.94 3.79 .148 .017 .114 
 (.068) (.081) (.165) (.170) (.486) 
Household asset score  
137 .241 .253 -.012 -.017 .028* 
 (.006) (.007) (.201) (.170) (.058) 
Birth rate 
137 .071 .065 .006** .005 .010** 
 (.002) (.002) (.019) (.119) (.026) 
Death rate 
137 .006 .006 .000 .001 -.001 
 (.001) (.001) (.981) (.590) (.717) 
Malaria incidence 137 .525 .513 .012 -.063** -.018 
(under age 3)  (.014) (.019) (.615) (.025) (.651) 
Catchment area size 
137 3.11 3.45 -.335 -.361 .238 
 (.133) (.255) (.248) (.178) (.657) 
Number of Observations 186 176   63 74 
 
Notes: ***, **, and * denote the significance level at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. Asset score is the number of items owned by a household 
out of the following: an improved toilet, a refrigerator, and a bicycle. See Data Appendix A.1 for detailed definitions of cognitive and non-
cognitive trait variables. Male circumcision treatment, HIV/AIDS education treatment, and scholarship treatment are binary indicators for 
the treatment status of AFF’s previous projects. Number of households is the average number of households that each enumerator was 
supposed to survey. Family size is the average number of family members per household. Household asset score is the number of items 
owned out of the following: improved toilet, bicycle, lamp, radio, cell phone, bed, and table and chair. Birth rate is the average number of 
births in the last 3 years per household. Death rate is the number of deaths in the last 12 months per household. Catchment area size is the 
land size subjectively reported by local health workers and AFF supervisors on a scale from 1 to 10. 
 
 
 Table 3 Job Offer Acceptance by Individual Trait 
 
Dependent Variable 
(Job offer acceptance) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
  Age BMI 
Number of 
siblings 
Asset score 
Currently 
working 
Self-esteem Intrinsic motivation 
Extrinsic 
motivation 
Trait 
 .042 -.028 .038* -.068
* -.107 -.024** -.012 -.019 
 (.030) (.018) (.019) (.040) (.136) (.010) (.108) (.136) 
Internship group 
-.024 -.323 -.901* -.029 -.023 -.025 -.321 .521 .733 
(.052) (.747) (.489) (.131) (.085) (.055) (.278) (.491) (.520) 
Trait * Internship group 
 .015 .044* -.002 -.009 .028 .015 -.176 -.266 
 (.037) (.025) (.028) (.054) (.180) (.014) (.157) (.182) 
Constant 
.481*** -.372 1.03*** .326*** .558*** .491*** .931*** .517 .537 
(.055) (.613) (.357) (.094) (.073) (.057) (.205) (.336) (.387) 
Observations 362 362 360 362 362 362 362 362 361 
R-squared .018 .046 .028 .036 .036 .021 .034 .027 .031 
Mean (SD)  20.4(1.65) 19.8(2.13) 4.39(1.80) 1.14(.896) .086(.280) 19.3(3.69) 3.09(.340) 2.84(.282) 
Dependent Variable 
(Job offer acceptance) 
(10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) 
Extroversion Agreeableness Conscientiousness 
Emotional 
stability 
Openness to 
experiences 
Time 
preference 
Risk 
preference 
Rational decision-
making ability 
Cognitive 
ability index 
Trait 
-.058* -.001 .046* .011 -.001 .196 .288 .019 -.126** 
(.032) (.027) (.026) (.027) (.027) (.284) (.498) (.274) (.053) 
Internship group 
-.297* .025 .251 .145 .041 -.096 .388 -.228 -.034 
(.173) (.196) (.216) (.195) (.187) (.158) (.413) (.305) (.052) 
Trait * Internship group 
.077* -.010 -.049 -.033 -.013 .199 -.644 .257 -.057 
(.046) (.037) (.037) (.037) (.035) (.384) (.640) 0.363) (.073) 
Constant 
.683*** .486*** .223 .426*** .485*** .407*** .299 .502** .490*** 
(.126) (.148) (.152) (.148) (.148) (.130) (.324) (.234) (.054) 
Observations 358 362 361 360 362 334 335 334 362 
R-squared .027 .019 .026 .020 0.019 .024 .019 .019 0.060 
Mean (SD) 3.54(1.16) 5.11(1.39) 5.68(1.35) 5.07(1.45) 5.36(1.35) .396(.144) .635(.083) .826(.149) .348(.477) 
 
Notes: Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote the significance level at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. Asset score is the sum of items owned out of improved 
toilet, refrigerator, and bicycle. See Data Appendix A.1 for the definitions of cognitive and non-cognitive trait variables. 
 Table 4: Training Performance 
 
Dependent variable 
Quiz score Practice survey error rate 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Panel A: 148 Trainee Sample         
Internship group 
-2.01*** -1.93*** .104*** .089*** .234 
(.344) (.308) (.026) (.029) (.187) 
Observations 148 148 148 148 148 
R-squared .228 .520 .114 .239 .800 
Wage Group Mean  
(SD) 
8.43 (1.82) .272 (.142) 
Panel B: 137 Enumerator Sample       
Internship group 
-1.44*** -1.45*** .094*** .080*** .229 
(.329) (.294) (.028) (.030) (.189) 
Observations 137 137 137 137 137 
R-squared .163 .490 .099 .243 .856 
Wage Group Mean  
(SD) 
8.43 (1.82) .272 (.142) 
Individual characteristics No YES No No YES 
Practice survey pair FE No No No YES YES 
 
Notes: Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote the significance level at 1%, 5%, 
and 10%, respectively. All specifications include the number of siblings and binary indicators for previous AFF 
programs. The practice survey error rate regression includes a binary indicator for the survey questionnaire type. A 
practice survey pair is a trainee pair who conducted the practice survey with each other. Individual characteristics 
include age, asset score, cognitive ability index, and a set of non-cognitive traits (self-esteem, intrinsic and 
extrinsic motivation, and Big 5 personality items). 
 
 
 Table 5 Selection and Causal Effects of Work Incentives on Job Performance 
 
VARIABLES 
Survey quality 
(error rate) 
Survey quantity  
(number of surveys per day) 
Subjective performance evaluation  
Subjective evaluation of work 
attitude 
(by survey respondents) (by supervisors) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Panel A: Selection effect (G2 vs G3)                  
G2 
-.020* -.021** -.021** 1.48*** 1.41*** 1.31** .783** .691* .682* -.174* -.137 -.135 
(.011) (.008) (.008) (.516) (.486) (.546) (.387) (.364) (.382) (.100) (.108) (.115) 
Observations 11,130 11,130 11,130 1,003 1,003 1,003 6,473 6,473 6,473 65 65 65 
R-squared .156 .302 .302 .144 .166 .173 .443 .592 .594 .401 .606 .634 
 Mean (SD) of G3 .077 (.078) 10.7 (5.45) 2.09 (1.65) .850 (.163) 
Panel B: Causal effect of  career incentives (G3 vs. G4)                
G3 
.011 .006 .007 -.594 -.867 -.894 .095 .391 .327 .305*** .277*** .289*** 
(.011) (.010) (.009) (.602) (.623) (.612) (.368) (.351) (.346) (.038) (.048) (.050) 
Observations 11,775 11,775 11,775 1,063 1,063 1,063 7,233 7,233 7,233 74 74 74 
R-squared .181 .265 .273 .149 .185 .189 .379 .492 .499 .619 .681 .693 
 Mean (SD) of G4 .082 (074) 11.5 (6.36) 2.08 (1.59) .583 (.119) 
Panel C: Causal effect of  wage (G1 vs. G2)                 
G2 
-.028* -.019* -.017 1.19* 1.18 1.18* .276 .237 .021 -.134 -.151 -.238 
(.017) (.011) (.011) (.619) (.735) (.679) (.546) (.608) (.609) (.155) (.233) (.224) 
Observations 9,779 9,779 9,779 914 914 914 4,516 4,516 4,516 63 63 63 
R-squared .167 .354 .357 .203 .229 .238 .389 .607 .656 .366 .502 .561 
 Mean (SD) of G1 .075 (.068) 9.84 (5.19) 2.67 (1.66) .803 (.162) 
Panel D: Combined effect (G1 vs. G4)                  
G1 
-.002 -.003 -.004 -1.45 -1.35 -.876 -.269 -.042 -.076 .191*** .202** .191* 
(.013) (.013) (.014) (.984) (1.05) (1.05) (.474) (.472) (.552) (.067) (.092) (.096) 
Observations 10,424 10,424 10,424 974 974 974 5,276 5,276 5,276 72 72 72 
R-squared .194 .276 .277 .157 .221 .225 .517 .623 .628 .569 .627 .636 
 Mean (SD) of G4 .082 (074) 11.5 (6.36) 2.08 (1.59) .583 (.119) 
Individual characteristics NO YES YES NO YES YES NO YES YES NO YES YES 
Training performance NO NO YES NO NO YES NO NO YES NO NO YES 
 
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the enumerator level are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote the significance level at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. All 
specifications include the number of siblings, catchment area characteristics, supervisor team-specific post visit variables, survey date-fixed effect, and binary indicator variables for 
previous AFF programs. Individual characteristics include age, asset score, cognitive ability index, and a set of non-cognitive traits (self-esteem, intrinsic and extrinsic motivation, and 
Big 5 personality items). Training performances include the quiz score and practice survey error rate. Catchment area characteristics include the total number of households, family size, 
asset score, number of births in the last 3 years, incidence of malaria among children under 3, and deaths in the last 12 months.  
 Table 6: Impacts of Supervisor Visits 
 
Variable 
Survey quality  
(error rate) 
Survey quantity  
(number of surveys per day) 
Subjective performance 
evaluation  
(by survey respondents) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
First visit 
-.008 -.005 1.06* .839 -.349 -.536** 
(.006) (.006) (.557) (.606) (.244) (.251) 
Second visit 
.008 .005 -1.78 -.954 -.118 .149 
(.007) (.008) (1.36) (1.44) (.275) (.310) 
Observations 20,381 20,381 1,841 1,841 11,099 11,099 
R-squared .221 .228 .086 .125 .273 .296 
Linear time trend YES No YES No YES No 
Survey date fixed effect No YES No YES No YES 
Mean (SD)  
of the dependent variable 
.074 (.071) 10.9 (5.70) 2.29 (1.69) 
 
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the enumerator level are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at 1%, 
5%, and 10%, respectively. All specifications include catchment area characteristics, study group fixed effect (G1–G4), and binary 
indicator variables for previous AFF programs. Catchment area characteristics include the total number of households, family size, asset 
score, number of births in the last 3 years, malaria incidence among children under 3, and deaths in the last 12 months. Individual 
characteristics include age, number of siblings, asset score, cognitive ability index, and a set of non-cognitive traits (self-esteem, intrinsic 
and extrinsic motivation, and Big 5 personality items). 
 
 Table 7: Short-term Impacts of Job Experience on Employment 
 
VARIABLES 
Currently working for paid job 
(1) (2) 
Panel A: Effect of career incentives (Internship group vs. Wage group) 
Received an internship offer 
.054** .048* 
(.027) (.027) 
Observations 355 349 
R-squared .029 .080 
Wage Group Mean (SD) .041 (.198) 
Panel B: Those who accepted and rejected an internship offer vs Wage group 
Accepted an internship offer 
.099** .091** 
(.045) (.045) 
Declined an internship offer 
.025 .018 
(.029) (.029) 
Observations 355 349 
R-squared .038 .090 
Omitted Group Mean (SD) .041 (.198) 
Individual characteristics NO YES 
 
Notes: ***, **, and * denote the significance level at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. All specifications include binary 
indicator variables for previous AFF programs. Individual characteristics include age, number of siblings, asset score, 
cognitive ability index, and a set of non-cognitive traits (self-esteem, intrinsic and extrinsic motivation, and Big 5 
personality items). 
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Table A.1: Randomization balance check between treatment and non-selected groups 
 
Variable 
Number of 
observation 
Internship + Wage 
group 
Non-selected 
group 
Mean difference (p-value) 
Internship + Wage  
vs Non-selected 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Panel A:  2011 secondary school census survey    
Height 
534 164.5 164.5 .047 
 (.367) (.743) (.955) 
Weight 
535 53.5 53.9 -.430 
 (.342) (.984) (.680) 
Age in 2011 
536 16.1 16.0 .065 
 (.070) (.197) (.758) 
Living with a father 
536 .639 .645 -.006 
 (.023) (.050) (.908) 
Living with a mother 
536 .747 .667 .081 
 (.021) (.049) (.134) 
Asset score in 2011 
530 1.17 1.41 -.240** 
 (.042) (.106) (.037) 
Subjective health is  
good or very good 
536 .433 .538 .104* 
 (.024) (.052) (.070) 
Raven matrix test score 
452 20.0 18.7 1.32 
  (.244) (.696) (.077) 
Number of observations 536 440 96   
Panel B: 2014 baseline survey 
    
Age in 2014 
443 20.4 20.0 .395** 
 (.087) (.159) (.031) 
Number of siblings 
443 4.39 4.49 .071 
 (.094) (.243) (.771) 
Asset score in 2014 
443 1.14 1.22 -.084 
 (.047) (.102) (.457) 
Currently working 
442 .086 .099 -.014 
 (.015) (.033) (.697) 
Self-esteem 
443 19.3 20.1 -.706 
 (.194) (.421) (.134) 
Intrinsic motivation 
443 3.09 3.10 -.005 
 (.018) (.038) (.912) 
Extrinsic motivation 
442 2.84 2.81 -.026 
  (.015) (.031) (.480) 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
Table A.1: Randomization balance check between treatment and non-selected groups (continued) 
 
Variable 
Number of 
observation 
Internship + Wage 
group 
Non-selected 
group 
Mean difference (p-value) 
Internship + Wage  
vs Non-selected 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Extroversion 
433 3.54 3.44 .103 
 (.061) (.136) (.523) 
Agreeableness 
443 5.10 5.46 -.356** 
 (.074) (.149) (.034) 
Conscientiousness 
442 5.69 6.17 -.487*** 
 (.071) (.147) (.002) 
Emotional stability 
439 5.07 5.31 -.237 
 (.076) (.164) (.207) 
Openness to experiences 
443 5.12 5.76 -.332 
 (.077) (.150) (.115) 
Time preference 
402 .396 .366 .030 
 (.008) (.016) (.101) 
Risk preference 
403 .635 .656 -.020* 
 (.005) (.011) (.089) 
Rational decision-making ability 
402 .826 .786 .040* 
 (.008) (.020) (.068) 
Cognitive ability index 
443 .014 .049 .084 
 (.034) (.049) (.297) 
Male circumcision treatment 
443 .442 .506 -.064 
 (.026) (.056) (.300) 
HIV/AIDS education treatment 
443 .478 .506 -.028 
 (.026) (.056) (.648) 
Scholarship treatment 
443 .456 .469 -.013 
 (.026) (.056) (.829) 
Transportation reimburse 
443 1536 1511.1 24.9 
 (30.3) (69.2) (.742) 
Number of observations 443 362 81   
Notes: ***, **, and * denote the significance level at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Table A.2: Individual characteristics between baseline survey participants and non-participants 
 
Variable 
Participants Non-participants 
Mean difference 
between 
participants and 
non-participants 
(p-value)  
(1) (2) (3) 
Height 
164.6 164.5 .071 
(.420) (.818) (.939) 
Weight 
53.6 54.1 -.486 
(.377) (1.09) (.674) 
Age 
16.1 16.0 .134 
(.078) (.222) (.571) 
Living with a father 
.667 .622 -.045 
(.054) (.026) (.450) 
Living with a mother 
.740 .679 .061 
(.023) (.053) (.296) 
Asset score 
2.46 3.12 -.656*** 
(.086) (.197) (.003) 
Subjective health  
(good or very good) 
.428 .551 .123* 
(.026) (.057) (.051) 
Raven’s matrices test score 
19.9 18.8 1.04 
(.274) (.785) (.216) 
Number of observations 362 78   
Notes: ***, **, and * denote the significance level at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.  The statistics are calculated based on 
data from the 2011 secondary school survey. Columns (1) and (2) show group-specific means and standard deviations. 440 male 
secondary school graduates were randomly selected to receive a job offer without prior notice, but only 362 showed up on the 
survey date. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Table A.3: Individual characteristics after job offer acceptance 
 
Variable 
Number of 
observations 
Internship 
offer takers 
Wage 
offer takers 
Mean 
Difference 
Standard 
Deviation 
(1) (2) (3) (4)=(2)-(3) (5) 
Age 148 20.8 20.7 .162 1.46 
BMI 148 19.9 19.5 .413 2.08 
Number of siblings 148 4.86 4.46 .405 1.70 
Asset score 148 .932 1.05 -.122 .804 
Currently working 148 .081 .054 .027 .252 
Self-esteem 148 19.1 18.6 .521 3.71 
Intrinsic motivation 148 3.05 3.08 -.029 .326 
Extrinsic motivation 148 2.78 2.83 -.046 .274 
Extroversion 148 3.67 3.27 .405** 1.19 
Agreeableness 148 5.03 5.10 -.074 1.44 
Conscientiousness 148 5.67 5.87 -.196 1.26 
Emotional stability 148 4.94 5.12 -.182 1.50 
Openness to experiences 148 5.03 5.10 -.074 1.44 
Time preference 137 .414 .411 .003 .136 
Risk preference 137 .621 .645 -.024* .079 
Rational decision-making 
ability 
137 .831 .834 -.004 .139 
Cognitive Ability Index 148 -.199 -.077 -.119 .591 
Male circumcision treatment 148 .392 .338 .054 .483 
HIV/AIDS education 
treatment 
148 .473 .473 .000 .501 
Scholarship treatment 148 .459 .473 -.013 .501 
Transportation reimburse 148 1602.7 1652.7 -50.0 628.2 
F-statistics (p-value)    .950 (.532)  
Number of Individuals   74 74 148 148 
Notes: ***, **, and * denote the significance level at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. Asset score is the sum of items owned out of 
improved toilet, refrigerator, and bicycle. See Data Appendix A.1 for the definitions of cognitive and non-cognitive trait variables. 
Male circumcision, HIV/AIDS education treatment, and scholarship are binary indicator variables of the past eligibility status of 
AFF’s previous programs. 
 Table A.4: Selection and causal effects of work incentives on job performance: additional outcomes  
 
VARIABLES 
Survey quality Survey quantity 
Proportion of entries 
incorrectly entered 
Proportion of entries 
incorrectly blank 
Work hours (in mins) 
Survey time per 
household (in mins) 
Intermission time between 
surveys (in mins) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Panel A: Selection effect (G2 vs G3)          
G2 .001 -.001 -.021** -.020*** -1.24 -4.62 -1.51 -1.09 -4.22 -3.90* 
  (.003) (.002) (.009) (.007) (18.3) (17.2) (1.14) (.978) (2.54) (2.31) 
Observations 11,130 11,130 11,130 11,130 988 988 11,130 11,130 8,224 8,223 
R-squared .107 .242 .148 .264 .146 .178 .282 .324 .019 .029 
 Mean (SD) of G3 .016 (.018) .062 (.070) 422.7 (198.7) 25.2 (10.9) 23.1 (50.2) 
Panel B: Causal effect of  career incentives (G3 vs. G4)            
G3 .002 .000 .010 .007 46.9*** 37.7** 1.09 1.40 6.57*** 5.82*** 
 (.003) (.003) (.009) (.008) (17.2) (18.4) (1.25) (1.15) (1.94) (2.00) 
Observations 11,775 11,775 11,775 11,775 1,054 1,053 11,775 11,775 9,040 9,040 
R-squared .161 .298 .161 .222 .146 .168 .250 .268 .019 .026 
 Mean (SD) of G4 .019 (.021) .063 (.066) 387.0 (194.8) 23.9 (11.2) 17.3 (44.0) 
Panel C: Causal effect of  wage (G1 vs. G2)              
G2 -.006 -.007** -.022 -.010 21.9 25.2 -2.97* -1.88 1.01 .339 
 (.004) (.003) (.014) (.009) (24.0) (23.2) (1.52) (1.60) (3.15) (3.51) 
Observations 9,779 9,779 9,779 9,779 889 888 9,780 9,780 7,203 7,202 
R-squared .102 .235 .148 .299 .190 .223 .305 .341 .021 .032 
 Mean (SD) of G1 .019 (.019) .056 (.061) 382.0 (188.2) 27.4 (12.1) 19.3 (41.8) 
Panel D: Combined effect (G1 vs. G4)          
G1 .007* .012** -.009 -.016 -17.9 -30.2 2.21 .157 2.39 1.43 
 (.004) (.005) (.011) (.011) (25.7) (28.8) (1.43) (1.50) (2.32) (2.18) 
Observations 10,424 10,424 10,424 10,424 955 953 10,425 10,425 8,019 8,019 
R-squared .158 .262 .167 .239 .157 .187 .282 .332 .014 .023 
 Mean (SD) of G4 .019 (.021) .063 (.066) 387.0 (194.8) 23.9 (11.2) 17.3 (44.0) 
Individual characteristics NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES 
Training performance NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES 
Notes: Standard errors clustered at enumerator level are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote the significance level at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. All specifications include number of siblings, survey-date 
fixed effect, catchment area control variables, supervisor team-specific post visit variables, and binary indicators of the past eligibility status of AFF’s previous programs. Individual characteristics include age, asset 
score, cognitive ability index, and a set of non-cognitive traits (self-esteem, intrinsic and extrinsic motivation, and Big 5 personality items). Catchment area control variables include the total number of households, 
the number of family members, asset score (whether to own improved toilet, bicycle, lamp, radio, cell phone, bed, and table and chair), the number of births per household in the last 3 years, incidence of malaria 
among children under 3, and deaths in the last 12 months. 
 
 
 Table A.5: Selection and causal effects of work incentives on job performance after excluding 11 enumerators from the Wage group 
 
VARIABLES 
Survey quality 
(error rate) 
Survey quantity  
(number of surveys) 
Subjective performance 
evaluation  
(by survey respondents) 
Subjective evaluation of work 
attitude 
(by supervisors) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Panel A: Selection effect (G2 vs G3)          
G2 -.005 -.014* -.012 1.82*** 1.70*** 1.60** .843** .814** .700 -.186* -.156 -.143 
  (.010) (.007) (.008) (.540) (.530) (.627) (.399) (.378) (.447) (.104) (.150) (.149) 
Observations 10,150 10,150 10,150 917 917 917 5,906 5,906 5,906 59 59 59 
R-squared .165 .293 .294 .152 .172 .177 .446 .584 .587 .394 .617 .657 
 Mean (SD) of G3 .067 (.064) 10.6 (5.60) 2.11 (1.66) .845 (.169) 
Panel B: Causal effect of  career incentives (G3 vs. G4)          
G3 .011 .013 .012 -1.30** -1.82** -1.97** .342 .594 .515 .325*** .308*** .324*** 
 (.009) (.010) (.011) (.624) (.764) (.745) (.410) (.371) (.363) (.052) (.076) (.083) 
Observations 9,666 9,666 9,666 876 876 876 5,983 5,983 5,983 63 63 63 
R-squared .197 .258 .260 .178 .207 .215 .348 .518 .526 .610 .692 .713 
 Mean (SD) of G4 .085 (.076) 11.5 (6.47) 1.94 (1.52) .596 (.123) 
Panel C: Causal effect of  wage (G1 vs. G2)           
G2 -.028* -.019* -.017 1.19* 1.18 1.18* .276 .237 .021 -.129 -.151 -.238 
 (.017) (.011) (.011) (.619) (.735) (.679) (.546) (.608) (.609) (.130) (.233) (.224) 
Observations 9,779 9,779 9,779 914 914 914 4,516 4,516 4,516 63 63 63 
R-squared .167 .354 .357 .203 .229 .238 .389 .607 .656 .344 .502 .561 
 Mean (SD) of G1 .075 (.068) 9.84 (5.19) 2.67 (1.66) .803 (.162) 
Panel D: Combined effect (G1 vs. G4)           
G1 .000 .002 .008 -1.32 -1.27 -.387 .013 .666 .767 .154** .095 .071 
  (.013) (.013) (.014) (1.02) (1.23) (1.25) (.439) (.456) (.550) (.063) (.099) (.105) 
Observations 9,295 9,295 9,295 873 873 873 4,593 4,593 4,593 67 67 67 
R-squared .196 .282 .290 .177 .232 .239 .574 .710 .718 .587 .723 .742 
 Mean (SD) of G4 .085 (.076) 11.5 (6.47) 1.94 (1.52) .596 (.123) 
Individual characteristics NO YES YES NO YES YES NO YES YES NO YES YES 
Training performance NO NO YES NO NO YES NO NO YES NO NO YES 
Notes: 11 enumerators in the Wage group whose training performance is the lowest are excluded. Standard errors clustered at the enumerator level are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote the 
significance level at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. All specifications include binary indicators of the past eligibility status of AFF’s previous programs, number of siblings, supervisor-specific post-visit 
fixed effect, survey date-fixed effect and catchment area characteristics which include the total number of households, the number of family members, asset score, number of births in the last 3 years, number 
of incidences of malaria among children under 3, and number of deaths in the last 12 months. Individual characteristics include age, asset score, cognitive ability index, and a set of non-cognitive traits (self-
esteem, intrinsic and extrinsic motivation, and Big 5 personality items). 
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Figure A.1: Contract letter for Group 1 (G1)    Figure A.2: Contract letter for Group 2 (G2) and Group (G3)  
                (the same contract letter for both groups) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Figure A.3: Contract letter for Group 4 (G4)  
 
 
 
 Figure A.4: Training quiz questionnaire 
 
No. Question Answer (Point) 
1 
An important reason for conducting the census is to achieve an 
improvement of overall quality of health in TA Chimutu. Describe the other 
two reasons why we conduct the census. 
a. To make it possible to reach out to every 
pregnant woman who wanted to participate in the 
AFF MCH program.  (0.5) 
b. To enrich the stock of socio-demographic data 
in T/A Chimutu that is necessary for elaboration of 
the AFF MCH program.  (0.5) 
2 
Regarding the roles of the enumerator, there are two functions you should 
NOT perform. Please fill them in the blank spaces below. 
A) Not to _____________________________ 
B) Not to _____________________________ 
a. Not to make any influence on answers (0.5) 
 
b. Not to change orders or words of questions (0.5) 
3 
What is the main standard required for households to be enumerated in the 
“2015 census of TA Chimutu,” a modified version of the “population and 
housing census”? 
Enumeration of all people, all housing units, and 
all other structures in TA Chimutu, who have 
stayed in TA Chimutu for more than 3 months 
during the past 12 months  (1) 
4 
What is the name of the document that proves your eligibility to conduct the 
census? 
Endorsement letter (1) 
5 
As what kind of structure would you categorize the following?  
“A structure with sun-dried brick walls and asbestos roof” 
Semi-permanent (1) 
6 
Choose one that is not counted as a collective household. 
A)  Hospitals, including three staff houses sharing food 
B)  Lodge, including staff dwelling and sharing food 
C)  Prison with many inmates’ dwelling 
D)  Store with owner’s dwelling 
E)  Military barracks with soldiers’ dwelling 
D (1) 
7 
What is the name of the document you have to sign before you start 
enumeration? 
Consent form (1) 
8 
What are the three things you have to check before you leave the 
household? 
Questionnaire, outbuildings, and Household ID 
number. (1,  0.5 point for partially correct) 
9 
What number do you put when you cannot meet any respondent from the 
household? 
a. Do not put any number and just note down the 
household. (0.5) 
b. Put the latest number on it if you arrange to meet 
later. (0.5) 
10 
Your distributed alphabet is “C” and this household is the third household 
you enumerated in the catchment area. How did you place an ID number on 
the wall of the household?  
0003C (1) 
11 
True or false questions 
A) It is okay if the questionnaire gets wet when there is heavy rain. 
B) You should not come to the completion meeting if you did not finish 
enumeration of your area. 
C) If you complete enumeration in your area, you should report to your 
supervisors immediately. 
D) You should bring all your housing necessities to the kickoff meeting. 
A) False (0.5) 
B) False (0.5) 
C) True (0.5) 
D) True (0.5) 
Note: The answers were not indicated in the actual training quiz questionnaire. 
  
Figure A.5: Daily job performance trend 
 
 
Panel A: Survey error rate        Panel B: Number of surveys per day 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: The light-blue solid and red dotted horizontal lines in each panel indicate the daily job performance of Group 2 and Group 3, respectively. The vertical lines indicate 95% 
confidence intervals.  
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Figure A.6: Training outcomes 
 
 
Panel A: Quiz score       Panel B: Practice survey error rate 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: The maximum quiz score is 12. The vertical lines indicate 95% confidence intervals. 
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 Data Appendix 
 
Data A.1: Measurement of cognitive abilities and non-cognitive traits 
 
A.1.1. Cognitive abilities 
Raven’s Progressive Matrices test  
This is a widely used non-verbal test that evaluates “observation skills and clear-thinking ability” 
(Raven et al., 1998). Since it is independent of language skills, it is very easy to conduct in any 
setting including developing countries where the mother tongue is not English. The following 
figure is one example of the test questionnaire. In the test, a subject is required to choose one of 
eight options that match a missing pattern in the box. All questions follow similar visual patterns.  
 
 
O*NET Ability Profiler  
The O*NET Ability Profiler was originally developed by the United States Department of Labor 
as “a career exploration tool to help understand job seekers on their work skills (O*NET Resource 
Center, 2010, p. 1)”. We use the verbal and clerical ability tests of the Ability Profiler, as these 
skills are the most relevant for the enumerator job. 
a. The verbal ability test measures how well a test subject understands the definition 
of English words and properly uses them in conversation. The following is an example 
of the test questionnaire:  
“Choose the two words that are either most closely the same or most closely opposite in 
meaning.” 
 
  
 
b. The clerical perception test measures an individual’s “ability to see details in 
written materials quickly and correctly. It involves noticing if there are mistakes in the 
text and numbers, or if there are careless errors in working math problems.(O*NET 
Resource Center, 2010, p. 2).” The following is an example of the test questionnaire: 
On the line in the middle, write S if the two names are exactly the same and write D if they are 
different. 
 
 
Math and English scores of Malawi School Leaving Certificate Exam in 2014  
All secondary school students in Malawi are required to take the Malawi School Leaving 
Certificate Exam during the third semester in Form 4 of secondary school (Grade 12 in the U.S.) 
to achieve an official secondary school graduation status. The Malawi National Examination Board 
(MANEB) administers the whole process of the exam. Each student chooses 6–8 subjects out of 
approximately 20 subjects prepared by MANEB (MANEB, 2014). Math and English are 
mandatory subjects. The results of each subject are reported in terms of a scale from 1 to 9. We 
use English and math test scores because they are mandatory subjects and thus, there are no 
missing values in the exam transcripts. We obtained the administrative record of the MSCE exam 
transcripts for all study participants through the Malawi Ministry of Education.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 A.1.2. Non-cognitive traits 
Rosenberg self-esteem scale  
This is a 10-item scale developed by Rosenberg (1965) and is widely used to measure self-esteem 
by measuring positive and negative feelings about the self. All items are answered using a 4-point 
Likert scale format ranging from strongly agree to strongly disagree.  
 
Intrinsic motivation 
Intrinsic motivation is an individual’s trait that captures whether the individual is motivated to 
do things by intrinsic rewards such as his/her own desire to pursue goals or challenges. It is the 
opposite of extrinsic motivation described below. We measure intrinsic motivation using a 15-item 
scale (Amabile et al., 1994). All items are answered using a 4-point Likert scale format ranging 
from strongly agree to strongly disagree.  
 
Extrinsic motivation  
Extrinsic motivation is an individual’s trait that captures whether the individual is motivated by 
external rewards, such as reputation, to do things. We use a 15-item scale to measure the level of 
motivation triggered by extrinsic values (Amabile et al., 1994). All items are answered using a 4-
point Likert scale format ranging from strongly agree to strongly disagree.  
 
Ten-item Big Five personality inventory (TIPI) 
We measure an individual’s personality types using a 10-item scale that assesses the respondent’s 
characteristics based on traits commonly known as the Big 5 personality traits (openness to 
experience, conscientiousness, extroversion, agreeableness, and emotional stability) (Gosling et 
al., 2003). All items are answered using a 7-point Likert scale format (Disagree strongly, Disagree 
moderately, Disagree a little, Neither agree nor disagree, Agree a little, Agree moderately, and 
Agree strongly).  
 
Time preference 
Participants were given 20 decision problems. In each, they were asked to choose 1 out of 11 
options on the line. Each option [X, Y] is a payoff set indicating the amount of money (X) they 
would receive 14 days later and the amount of money (Y) they would receive 21 days later (see 
the figure below). Participants were informed that AFF would randomly choose 1 out of 20 
problems and would provide the amount of payoff the participants selected in the chosen decision 
problem according to the payoff rule.  
  
 
The choices that individuals made through this experiment were used to infer their time 
preference, measured between 0 and 1 following the methodology proposed by Choi et al. 
(2007). The closer the value is to 1, the more impatient a participant is, and the closer the value is 
to 0, the more patient the participant is.  
 
Risk preference 
Participants were given 20 decision problems. In each, they were asked to choose 1 option out of 
11 options on the line. An option [X, Y] indicates the amount of money a participant would earn 
if the X-axis (the horizontal axis) was chosen and the amount of money a participant would earn 
if the Y-axis (the vertical axis) was chosen (see the figure below). Participants were informed that 
AFF would randomly choose one out of 20 problems, and again randomly choose either X or Y 
with equal probability, and that the chosen payoff would be provided to the participants.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 The choices made by individuals through this experiment were used to infer their individual-
level risk preference, measured between 0 and 1 following the methodology proposed by Choi et 
al. (2007). The closer the value is to 1, the more risk-taking a participant is, and the closer the 
value is to 0.5, the more risk-averse the participant is. Values lower than 0.5 reflect a violation of 
stochastic dominance and are excluded from the analysis (Choi et al, 2007).  
 
Rational decision-making ability 
Using the Critical Cost Efficiency Index (CCEI; Afriat, 1972), we measured a level of 
consistency with the Generalized Axiom of Revealed Preference (GARP) based on the results from 
the time preference experiment. Considering all 20 decision problems in the time preference 
experiment, CCEI counts by how much the slope of the budget line in each problem should be 
adjusted to remove all violations of GARP. We took CCEI into account for the level of rational 
decision-making ability (Choi et al, 2014). CCEI is measured between 0 and 1. The closer CCEI 
is to 1, the more a participant satisfies GARP overall, and the more rational (from an economic 
prospective) are the decisions made.  
Data A.2: Measurement of survey quality  
 
AFF checked each questionnaire one by one and counted systematically inconsistent errors. 
First, census supervisors listed all possible systematic errors that could result from enumerators, 
not respondents. Second, data-entry clerks went through repeated training to catch those errors. 
Then, they started counting the number of systematic errors caused by enumerators for each 
sheet of the census survey.  
Error collecting work was carried out in the following steps. 
1. Two error-collecting data entry clerks checked one questionnaire separately. 
2. They counted the total number of questions that must be answered. 
3. Three types of errors from each page of the questionnaire were counted, as follows.  
1) The total number of questions that must be answered but are blank. 
2) The total number of questions that must be answered but are incorrectly answered. 
3) The total number of questions that must not be answered but are answered. 
4. All the numbers on each page are added up and the total number of errors is recorded 
5. The total number of errors independently counted by the two clerks is compared. 
6. If the difference between the total errors counted by the two data entry clerks is larger than 5, a 
recount is undertaken.  
7. The mean of the number of errors counted by the two data entry clerks is recorded.  
 The following table provides the basic statistics of each number counted. 
Index Measurement Mean (SD) 
A The total number of all questions that must be answered 221.7 (61.8) 
B The total number of questions that must be answered but are blank 7.59 (10.3) 
C 
The total number of questions that must be answered but are incorrectly 
answered 
3.90 (4.26) 
D 
The total number of questions that must not be answered but are 
answered 
5.53 (9.28) 
 
Note: A could be different across households due to differences in household-specific characteristics, such as 
family structure. 
 
Finally, the final variable we use for survey quality (error rate) in the analysis is constructed as 
follows: 
error𝑖 = (B𝑖 + C𝑖 + D𝑖)/A𝑖 
where errori is the error rate of a specific census questionnaire i surveyed by an enumerator.  
Ai, Bi, Ci, and Di are the corresponding numbers counted from the i-th census survey 
questionnaire by data clerks. 
 
Data A.3: Imputation of missing survey beginning and end times 
 
We find that there are significant missing values in the entries for the survey beginning time 
and end time of census interviews due to the enumerators’ mistakes. To preserve the sample size, 
we impute either the survey beginning time or the end time when only one of them is missing. 
Specifically, we run the regression of the questionnaire-specific length of survey.  
 
  Surveytime i j k l t=α+γ·H i+ф·Zk+V l t+σ t+ψ i j k l t     (A1)  
 
Surveytimeijktl is survey time of household i by enumerator j  whose supervisor is l, in 
catchment area k, surveyed on the t-th work day. Hi is a vector of respondents’ household 
characteristics and Zk is a vector of catchment area characteristics. σt is the survey-date fixed 
effect. Vlt is the supervisor team-specific post-visit effect.  
For the surveyed census questionnaire sheets with either missing start time or end time, we 
impute the missing time using the predicted length of a survey from the above regression. Note 
 that we cannot use this method for an observation when both starting and ending times are 
missing. In this case, we do not make any changes and thus the intermission time and survey 
length remain missing.  
 
Data A.4: 2011 HIV/AIDS prevention programs of African Future Foundation 
 
The HIV/AIDS prevention program of AFF covered 33 public schools in four districts in 2011: 
Traditional Authority (TA) Chimutu, TA Chitukula, TA Tsabango, and TA Kalumba. In Table A.6, 
the experimental design of the 2011 HIV/AIDS prevention program is summarized. The 
randomization process was implemented in two stages. Three types of interventions were 
randomly assigned to treatment groups independently. For the HIV/AIDS education and male 
circumcision programs, classrooms were randomly assigned to one of the three groups: 100% 
Treatment, 50% Treatment, and No Treatment classrooms. Treated students in the 50% Treatment 
classrooms were randomly selected at the individual level. The treatments were given to everybody 
in 100% Treatment classrooms. No one received the treatment in the No Treatment classrooms. 
For the girls’ education support program, classrooms were randomly assigned either to the 100% 
Treatment or No Treatment group. AFF expected minimal spill-over between classes because there 
were limited cross-classroom activities and the majority (29 out of 33) of the schools had only one 
class per grade.  
The HIV/AIDS education intervention was designed to provide the most comprehensive 
HIV/AIDS education. In addition to the existing HIV/AIDS education curriculum, AFF provided 
information on the medical benefits of male circumcision and the relative risk of cross-generational 
sexual relationships. The education was provided to both male and female students by trained staff 
members with a government certificate. The HIV/AIDS education was comprised of a 45-minute 
lecture and a 15-minute follow-up discussion. Study participants were assigned to one of four 
research groups: 100% Treatment (E1), Treated in 50% Treatment (E2), Untreated in 50% 
Treatment (E3), and No Treatment (E4). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Table A.6: Experimental Design 
 
1) HIV/AIDS Education 
  Group Assignment Classrooms Students 
100% Treatment E1 Treatment 41 2480 
50% Treatment 
E2 Treatment 
41 
1303 
E3 No Treatment 1263 
No Treatment E4 
No Treatment 
(Control) 
42 2925 
Total     124 7971 
2) Male Circumcision 
100% Treatment C1 Treatment 41 1293 
50% Treatment 
C2 Treatment 
41 
679 
C3 No Treatment 679 
No Treatment C4 
No Treatment 
(Control) 
42 1323 
Total     124 3974 
3) Girls' Education Support 
100% Treatment S1 Treatment 62 2102 
No Treatment S2 
No Treatment 
(Control) 
62 1895 
Total     124 3997 
Notes: For the HIV/AIDS education and Male circumcision interventions, the randomization was done in two stages. First, classrooms for 
each grade across 33 schools were randomly assigned to one of three groups: 100% treatment, 50% treatment, and no treatment. Then, within 
the 50% treatment group, only half of the students were randomly assigned to receive the treatment. 
 
The male circumcision offer consisted of free surgery at the assigned hospital, two complication 
check-ups (3-days and 1-week after surgery) at students’ schools, and transportation support. Free 
surgery and complication check-ups were available for all study participants, but transportation 
support was randomly given. Selected students could either choose a direct pick-up service or use 
a transportation voucher that is reimbursed after the circumcision surgery at the assigned hospital. 
The value of the transportation voucher varied according to the distance between the hospital and 
a student’s school. Study participants were also assigned to one of four research groups: 100% 
Treatment (C1), Treated in 50% Treatment (C2), Untreated in 50% Treatment (C3), and No 
Treatment (C4).  Transportation support was given to groups C1 and C2 during the study period, 
and the remaining temporarily untreated group (groups C3 and C4) received the same treatment 
one year later. 
 The girls’ education support program provided a one-year school tuition and monthly cash 
stipends to female students in randomly selected classrooms (S1). School tuition and fees per 
semester (on average US$7.5, 3,500 MWK) were directly deposited to each school’s account and 
monthly cash stipends of 0.6 USD (300 MWK) were distributed directly to treated students. The 
total amount of scholarship was approximately US$24 per student during the study period. 
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